Theologians are everywhere actively interested in De la Taille's theory of the supernatural, an exposé of which appeared recently in these pages.
"Hence, in the Hypostatic Union we may say that God's presence by operation precedes, according to a priority of reason, His presence by communication. His presence by operation is common to the whole Trinity. His presence by substantial communication of His Being is proper to the Word alone. Through God's presence by operation the human nature is elevated by the infused disposition to a level where it bears the necessary proportion of potency to the Uncreated Act which subtantially actuates it. By God's presence by communication the potency is united with the Act as the terminus of the Hypostatic Union."
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Here we have a precedence of the disposition, efficiently caused by the Blessed Trinity, over the union with the Word in the hypostatic union. The Trinity operates and causes the disposition; then the Word, the uncreated act, by a communication of Himself, unites Himself to the human nature already disposed for the union. There is an assertion of a precedence here which it is difficult to reconcile with the preceding statements that the disposition in no wise precedes the union. Father Donnelly tells us that God's presence by operation has a priority of reason over His presence by communication. It is also true that a disposition has by its nature an ontological priority over that for which it disposes. Without this priority a disposition has no meaning.
There is no question about the fact that De la Taille excludes any temporal priority of the created disposition over the union between the created potency and the uncreated act. In excluding temporal priority, however, does he also exclude this ontological priority that necessarily belongs to every disposition? Clearly, no. He could not and at the same time remain true to his own reason as well as to the teaching of St. Thomas.
Created actuation by the uncreated act, according to De la Taille, is verified in the case of union with God through sanctifying grace and through the lumen gloriae, and in the hypostatic union. In each of these cases the actuation is a "disposition immédiate à l'Acte, et par conséquent non pas antécédent, mais introduite par l'Acte lui-même. . . ." 6 This can only mean that there is no temporal priority of the disposition over union with the act, but it does not exclude the above-mentioned priority of the efficient causality of the Blessed Trinity making the human nature of Christ disposed for union with the Word in the hypostatic union, making the created intellect disposed for union with the uncreated intelligible form (and for the resulting intellectual operation) in the lumen gloriae, and making the soul disposed for the union with the Holy Spirit through the possession of sanctifying grace. St. Thomas expressly teaches that "dispositio prior est eo ad quod disHbid., pp. S21-S22 (italics mine). There is first (ontologically) the union and presence by operation, and then (again ontologically) the presence and union by communication. The first is a union with the Trinity as the efficient cause of the disposition: this union or presence is demanded by the fact that God's operation is His essence. Once the created nature or faculty is suitably disposed, it is ready (again, not by a temporal but by an ontological priority) for an immediate union with the uncreated act, the divine essence, or the Person of the Word.
Father Donnelly tells us that this modification or disposition is introduced into the human nature by the Word, that it is caused by the act which is the Word Himself, and that it constitutes the hypostatic union in its fulness.
10 This requires examination.
In the hypostatic union it is not exactly the Word as such but the Trinity that causes^ the disposition, so that it is the Trinity that is present by this causal operation. The Word is indeed present in this operation, but only as one of the Trinity. This union by operation is not the hypostatic union, for the human nature of Christ was not hypostatically united to the Trinity. 11 There is certainly a priority of the principle of an act over its term. It is this priority we find in the divine nature causing the disposition, over the Word, the uncreated act, terminating the disposed human nature. The uncreated act does not efficiently cause or introduce the disposition: this is the function of the divine nature of the Trinity. It is the function of the act as such, the Word, to communicate itself, that is, to terminate, the disposed created nature.
This priority of union with the Trinity as causing the disposition, over union by communication of the uncreated act to the nature or potency already disposed, is found also in sanctifying grace, which is itself the disposition or created actuation, and in the lumen gloriae, which again is the disposition and actuation. In the hypostatic union we may call it the adaptation, the mutation, the elevation or the traction of the human nature by the Trinity, that makes it disposed for termination by the Word.
It is very important to observe that what is received into and by the created potency is not the uncreated act but the created actuation. The uncreated act cannot be received by or into any potency, as Father Donnelly well notes: "In pure actuation, the act is not received into . . . the potency: it merely terminates the potency which it actuates"; 12 "God . . . will not be received into . . . our created intellect."
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It is "the actuation" that is "received into the created potency" 14 ; "the created intellect must receive into it a created disposition."
15 Clearly, then, the communication of the act does not mean its reception into the potency. Only the created actuation, the disposition, is received.
Yet we are told on p. 514 that the disposition (he is speaking particularly of the lumen gloriae) "is but the communication to, or the reception of the act into, the potency." Is there not a confusing here of the act with the actuation, and vice versa? What we say of the actuation cannot be transferred to the act. The one is finite and created; the other is infinite and uncreated. There is a reception of the actuation, but no reception of the act. Communication in this case does not and cannot mean reception.
The disposition is efficiently caused by the Trinity. It is received into and by the potency. Simultaneously there occurs a communication on the part of the uncreated act of itself, which means that the disposed created nature or potency is now terminated by it and so is in union with it. Ontologically, however, there is a priority of the disposition, caused by the ll Summa Thed., I q, 3 a. Í.
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Op. cit., p. 513. Again to be accurate, De la Taille denies dependence, not reception, of the act by the potency: "il y aura reception de l'Acte dans la puissance" (op. cit., p. 2S4). This mutation, which is a necessary condition in order that the union with the espèce intelligible (the divine essence, in the case of the lumen gloriae) may begin, is the disposition that is ontologically prior to the union, although it is simultaneous with the beginning of the union. De la Taille rules out temporal precedence of the disposition over both the union with the act and the operation that flows from the union. Speaking of the lumen gloriae he refers to it as: "Cette disposition et à l'Acte et à l'opération, qui est en même temps la mutation de la puissance, l'union entre la puissance et l'Acte, tout cela, c'est la lumière de gloire. . . ."
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16 What I said can be summed up in this sentence: "Hence, the presence of God by operation, causing this adaptation, is necessarily presupposed to His presence by communication, but it is in the presence by communication that the supernatural essentially consists" (Eccl. Rev., LXXXXVin [1938], 410-411.) I7 "Actuation, etc.," pp. 255-256 (italics mine.) 1B lbid., p. 257 (italics mine).
Father Donnelly admits with de la Taille a precedence of the disposition over the operation that follows the union with the act. Yet De la Taille asserts that the lumen gloriae as a disposition plays a double role: it acts as a disposition to the uncreated intelligible form (the divine essence) as well as to the operation that succeeds: "Ce double rôle de disposition à la forme intelligible incréée et de disposition à l'opération intellectuelle correspondante. . . ."
19 Now I ask: if this disposition is ontologically prior to the operation that follows the union of the created intellect with divine intelligible form, why should it lose its nature as a disposition and cease to be prior (ontologically) to the uncreated intelligible form itself? It plays the same role in both cases: not temporal priority necessarily but certainly ontological. A subject that receives is prior, in the sense of prerequisite, to the perfection that it receives. The natural potency is prior to the actuation, the disposition, that it receives. When it is disposed, it is also ontologically prior to the higher, uncreated act which it does not receive but to which it is united terminally. The last disposition, which prepares the subject either to receive a created perfection or to be terminally united with the uncreated act, is always on the side of the potency, or the matter, and as such it must precede the act or form at least ontologically. When De la Taille says: "Par ailleurs toute disposition ultime à l'Acte, étant introduite par l'Acte luimême sur lequel elle s'ajuste, se trouve indissolublement liée à lui dans la puissance qu'il actue," 20 we must be careful about that "étant introduite par l'Acte lui-même." In the three cases of which he is speaking the efficient action of "introducing" the disposition is always an action of the divine nature that precedes, at least ontologically, the union of the suitably disposed created nature with the uncreated act. A last disposition may be simultaneously present with the act for which it disposes, but as a disposition it must precede by nature that act or perfection with which it begins to establish a union. " However, every actuation by the uncreated act bears two relations to the divinity. There is not only the relation of effect to cause; there is also the relation of actuation to act, which must not be confused with the former. Here we see clearly the priority secundum naturam of the production of the mutation or disposition by the efficient cause, the Blessed Trinity, over the union of the elevated potency with the act as the term of this union: The efficient cause, the Trinity, first (not temporally) produces the disposition, the mutation, the elevation, in the created potency (the soul, the intellect, or the human nature of Christ). Then the act (the Word, in the hypostatic union) gives itself, communicates itself, to the finite potency that is now disposed to receive (sic) it. In receiving the act the potency finds itself united to it, but it must, as a necessary condition, be made disposed for this reception. This is what he means when he says that it communicates or unites itself to a nature or potency that is divinely disposed for such a termination. The ambiguity is not removed until he distinguishes between the efficient causality of the Trinity and the quasi-formal causality of the uncreated act as such, and we see the ontological priority of the former (as causing the disposition) over the latter (as terminating the disposed nature). The same ambiguity, I believe, is to be found when he speaks of the created potency receiving the uncreated act, instead of (more accurately) receiving the created actuation.
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What Father Donnelly says is correct: "In pure actuation [that is, as opposed to information], the act is not received into . . . the potency: it merely terminates the potency which it actuates." De la Taille, however, says exactly the opposite. Now, the question arises: May we say that the uncreated act is received into or by any potency? We may, of course, say with St. Thomas that by grace and the infused gifts "recipimus Spiritum Sanctum." This statement does not commit us to any precise explanation as to bow we receive Him, nor is it equivalent to saying that the infinite act is received in or by a finite potency.
It is, however, a different matter when, in speaking of the hypostatic union, we say that the Word, the uncreated act, is received into the finite, created human nature of Christ. Billot formally denies this. He says that the divine act of existence of the Person of the Word actuates the human nature without being received in it, and it is this that precisely constitutes the mystery of the hypostatic union: ". . . non assequimur quo pacto actus existentiae possit actuare aliquam naturam citra receptionem in ilia."
32
There is, finally, an ambiguity in De la Taille's use of the term union. He refers to the lumen gloriae as a disposition that "constitutes the fact of the union in all its newness." 83 In what sense does a disposition constitute a union? The expression is vague until, in speaking of the hypostatic union, he makes the distinction between union in the formally relative sense, which is the actual termination of the potency by the act, and union in the sense of a passive mutation or disposition in the human nature of Christ, which is the foundation of the relation called union in the former, formal, sense. Now we see that union in the passive sense-which is the disposition, mutation or traction of the human nature-is not a union with the Word as such, but with the Trinity. In this case, therefore, it is not formally the hypostatic union. Furthermore, union in the passive sense is not consequent upon the union in the formally relative sense, but antecedent to it ontologically as its foundation.
Z1 lbid., p. 254: "Il y aura réception de l'Acte dans la puissance"; p. 2$S: Disposition . . . introduite par l'Acte lui-même, dont . . . elle n'est que ... la reception dans la puissance"; "Entretien, etc.," p. 133: "l'Acte se donne, se communique, à une puissance qui reçoit l'Acte." 32 Di Verbo Incarnato (Rome, 1927) , p. 144. 33 " Actuation, etc»," p. 256.
